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To counter response distortions associated with the use of rating scales in personality 
and similar assessments, test items may be presented in so-called ‘forced-choice’ formats. 
Respondents may be asked to rank-order a number of items, or distribute a fixed number of 
points between several items – therefore they are forced to make a choice. Until recently, 
basic classical scoring methods were applied to such formats, leading to scores relative to the 
person’s mean (ipsative scores). While interpretable in intra-individual assessments, ipsative 
scores are problematic when used for inter-individual comparisons. Recent advances in 
estimation methods enabled rapid development of item response models for comparative 
data, including the Thurstonian IRT model (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011a), the Multi-
Unidimensional Pairwise Preference model (Stark, Chernyshenko & Drasgow, 2005), and 
others. Appropriate item response modeling enables estimation of person scores that are 
directly interpretable for inter-individual comparisons, without the distortions and artifacts 
produced by ipsative scoring.  
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What are forced-choice response formats? 
 When thinking of a ‘typical’ questionnaire, we imagine a series of stimuli 
(statements, questions, words or phrases, pictures, etc.) that our subjects respond to, usually 
by selecting one of several response options. For example, we may ask respondents to 
indicate the extent to which the following statements are true of them: 
 very  
untrue of me 
somewhat 
untrue of me 
somewhat 
true of me 
very  
true of me 
I am relaxed most of the time  X   
I start conversations    X 
 
The common characteristic of this type of questionnaire format is that the stimuli (we 
will refer to them as questionnaire items) are responded to one at a time. Regardless of the 
exact type and number of response options used, respondents are supposed to consider one 
single stimulus at a time, and provide a response to it independently of other stimuli. This 
response format is called the single-stimulus format. The single-stimulus format is by far the 
most popular in psychometric practice. In his Theory of Data (1964), Clyde Coombs devoted 
a whole class (Type II) to single-stimulus data.  
There is, however, an alternative way to gather responses to the same stimuli. Instead 
of presenting them one by one, we can present two stimuli together and ask the respondents 
to express their preference with respect to the stimuli presented. For instance, for the two 
statements from the example above, we can ask them to indicate which statement is most 
true: 
  most  
true of me 
I am relaxed most of the time  




In this task, the respondent is forced to make a choice (hence the name – forced-
choice format). Regardless of whether both statements are true or untrue of the respondent, 
he/she will have to select one that is most true. This will unambiguously imply that the 
remaining statement is less true; therefore, a full rank order of the two statements is obtained. 
Examples of tests using forced-choice pairs are the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment 
System (TAPAS; Drasgow, Chernyshenko, and Stark 2010), and the Navy Computerized 
Adaptive Personality Scales (NCAPS; Schneider et al. 2007). 
We can add another statement to the forced-choice pair, and ask respondents to rank 
order three statements according to the extent to which they are true of them, for example: 
 
rank order  
I am relaxed most of the time 3 
I start conversations 1 
I catch on to things quickly 2 
 
Another variation of rank ordering is to ask respondents to select only the top and 
bottom ranks, as follows: 
 most / least  
true of me 
I am relaxed most of the time least 
I start conversations most 
I catch on to things quickly  
 
In the example scenario with three statements, making the ‘most’-‘least’ choices will 
unambiguously place the remaining statement in-between the two selected statements, and 
therefore this format is equivalent to complete rank ordering. If, however, we add another 
statement to make a block of four forced-choice items, selecting the top and bottom ranks 
would yield an incomplete ranking: 
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 most / least  
true of me rank order 
I am relaxed most of the time least 4 
I start conversations   
I catch on to things quickly   
I sympathize with others’ feelings most 1 
 
In the above example, the ranking is incomplete because we do not know which of the 
two remaining statements would receive rank ‘2’, and which one would receive rank ‘3’. 
There are more examples of forced-choice formats producing incomplete rankings, for 
instance this would occur if the respondent were asked to select only the top ranking item 
from a block of three or more items (as we already know, this format would yield a complete 
ranking if only two items were involved).  
All the above examples conform to an ordinal forced choice format (Chan 2003), 
since only the order of the items is obtained. Examples of tests using ordinal forced-choice 
formats are the Occupational Personality Questionnaire (OPQ32i; SHL 2006), the Personality 
and Preference Inventory (PAPI; Cubiks 2010), the Customer Contact Styles Questionnaire 
(CCSQ 7.2; SHL 1997), the Gordon's Personal Profile Inventory (GPP-I; Gordon 1993), the 
Survey of Interpersonal Values (SIV; Gordon 1976), and the Kolb Learning Style Inventory 
(Kolb & Kolb 2005).  
Another, more complicated type of ranking is the so-called Q-sort (Block 1961), 
whereby respondents perform ranking with ties. In this format, respondents have to assign a 
number of items to several categories, complying with a pre-defined distribution, (i.e. the 
number of items to be assigned to each category is fixed). For example, respondents are 
asked to sort 45 items into five piles, according to the extent to which the items are 





most uncharacteristic 1 2 3 4 5 most characteristic 
 5 10 15 10 5  
Number of items in pile 
 
Although seemingly a rating task, the Q-sort is in fact a pure forced-choice format, 
because rating decisions have to consider assignments to categories both below and above, 
thus necessitating direct comparisons between items. Examples of tests using this format are 
the California Adult Q-Set (Block 2008), the Riverside Behavioral Q-sort (Funder, Furr and 
Colvin 2000) and the Riverside Situational Q-sort (Wagerman and Funder, 2009). 
Some forced-choice formats go beyond simple rank ordering and involve judgments 
of the extent of preference for one item over another. In our example with two items, 




























































I am relaxed most of the time    X I start conversations 
 
Now we not only have the preferential ordering of the items; we also have some 
quantitative information about the relative merits of the two items. We can also collect 
quantitative information by asking the respondents to distribute a fixed number of points 
between several items. For instance, we may ask respondents to distribute 10 points between 
three statements according to the extent to which the statements are true of them: 
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 Points  
(10 in total) 
I am relaxed most of the time 1 
I start conversations 5 
I catch on to things quickly 4 
 
Comparing the above format with the most-least selections using the same items, it is 
clear that although the preference for the statement ‘I start conversations’ remains, the latter 
format captures more information about the extent of that preference.  From the example 
responses it can be seen that the respondent judged ‘I start conversations’ is only slightly 
more true of the self than ‘I catch on to things quickly’; however, he/she judged it to be much 
more true of  the self than ‘I am relaxed most of the time’. Another typical example of this 
format is asking respondents to distribute 100 points between several items; in this case, the 
points awarded to each item can be interpreted as percentages of a total amount. This type of 
forced choice is referred to as multiplicative or compositional (Chan 2003).  
Having considered several examples of forced-choice formats, the reader will see that 
they are fundamentally different from single-stimulus formats. When using single-stimulus 
formats, the respondents make absolute judgments about every individual item. When using 
forced-choice formats, the respondents engage in comparative judgments. The Theory of 
Data (Coombs, 1964) devotes two whole classes (Type I – Preferential Choice, and Type III – 
Stimulus Comparison) to data obtained by using forced-choice formats
i
. 
The advantages of presenting questionnaire items using the forced-choice format 
 While it is clear that forced-choice formats are different from single-stimulus 
formats, we have not yet discussed why we might want to present questionnaire items in this 
fashion. Do comparative judgments have any advantages over absolute judgments? Indeed, 
the forced-choice format does have its own merits.  
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Firstly, comparative judgments eliminate any systematic response sets that apply 
uniformly across items (Cheung and Chan 2002). For instance, having to make a choice 
between items will make it impossible to endorse them all indiscriminately (so-called 
acquiescence bias). It will also make it impossible to produce uniformly elevated or 
decreased judgments across all items, therefore eliminating rater effects such as leniency / 
severity. Indeed, if instead of rating several employees on the same performance indicator, a 
rater simply rank orders the employees according to their performance, any effects associated 
with leniency (or severity) of this particular rater are removed. Another example of uniform 
response sets is the individual tendency to provide extreme versus middle-ground ratings 
(extremity / central tendency responding). These tendencies are also overcome by the use of 
the forced-choice formats. 
Secondly, simple rank ordering removes the need for any rating scale. This is an 
important and perhaps overlooked advantage of ordinal forced-choice formats. In addition to 
the problem of extremity/central tendency, and biases caused by the order of response options 
and whether they have numerical or verbal anchors (e.g. Schwarz et al. 1991), there are 
further complex and difficult to classify issues which concern the idiosyncratic interpretation 
and use of rating scales. Respondents may interpret the response options or any other verbal 
and non-verbal anchors provided with the rating scale differently, resulting in a violation of 
the main assumption of rating scales – that their effects are fixed across respondents 
(Friedman and Amoo 1998). Some argue that performing direct comparisons between items 
may be simpler for respondents than arriving at ratings for each item – a process that requires 
discrimination between various response options (Maydeu-Olivares and Böckenholt 2008). 
This might be particularly true when rating scales contain many response options and provide 
few verbal anchors, or when the response options are ambiguous or inappropriate for the 
items. This argument, however, can be turned on its head when we consider extremely 
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complex forced-choice tasks such as Q-sorts. Clearly, the cognitive complexity of such 
forced-choice designs is by far greater than that of almost any rating scale.  
Thirdly, forced-choice formats may be useful in research involving personal or 
sensitive information.  Chan (2003) provides an example whereby respondents are asked to 
indicate the proportion of their household income spent on several commodity groups (food, 
clothes, electricity, etc.). In such a survey, the respondents may not want to disclose their 
spending patterns in monetary value, but they may be happy to provide a percentage 
breakdown. Taking issues of privacy into account is important in many research topics; and 
ensuring that the respondents’ privacy is protected may be essential for guaranteeing valid 
responses.   
Fourthly, imposing forced choices directly tackles the problem with lack of 
differentiation in ratings. This problem, reported over 100 years ago by Thorndike (1920) and 
still widespread in ratings of individuals, organizations and services, is known as the halo 
effect. The halo effect is characterized by overgeneralized assessments of all characteristics of 
the rated object based on one important dimension. Unlike uniform rater biases such as 
leniency/severity, the halo effect might not act uniformly across all items, and instead might 
influence some of them more than others. Forced choice makes raters differentiate between 
various characteristics of the rated object, and thus this reduces halo effects. Bartram (2007) 
showed that the use of forced-choice formats in line manager assessments of employees’ job 
competencies could increase correlations with external measures by as much as 50% 
compared to single-stimulus competency ratings.     
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, forced-choice formats have been used in 
personality and similar assessments when responses were thought to be subject to socially 
desirable responding, whether due to self-deception or motivated impression management 
(Zerbe and Paulhus 1987). The latter types of distortion often referred to as faking good are 
9 
 
of particular concern in high stakes assessments, such as assessments in recruitment or 
selection of employees. It has been argued that because it is impossible to endorse all items, 
when combining equally desirable items in the same forced-choice block that this would 
prevent respondents from endorsing the desirable items and rejecting the undesirable ones. 
Over the years, some authors have reported positive evidence for the use of forced-choice 
formats in these contexts (Christiansen, Burns, and Montgomery 2005; Jackson, Wroblewski, 
and Ashton 2000; Martin, Bowen, and Hunt 2001; Vasilopoulos et al. 2006), while others 
have found the forced-choice format to be as susceptible to faking as the single-stimulus 
format (Heggestad et al. 2006). While inarguably dependent on particular questionnaire 
designs and specific contexts, these disparate findings highlight problems in using the forced-
choice format for eliminating motivated response distortions. Matching items on social 
desirability levels is one such problem. Research shows that respondents have different 
perceptions of item desirability (Kuncel, Goldberg, and Kiger 2011). Coupled with the fact 
that item desirability depends on the testing context (e.g. the job for which respondents are 
being assessed), it follows that even the most careful matching cannot make all respondents 
in all contexts perceive all items in one block as equally desirable. Another problem was 
summarized by Feldman and Corah (1960), who argued that direct comparisons between 
items might actually invite finer distinctions between their desirability levels than rating each 
item independently, therefore potentially heightening the social desirability effects. The jury 
is still out on the question of the effectiveness of forced-choice formats in reducing socially 
desirable responding. We believe that to answer this question conclusively, a better 
understanding of the psychological process behind socially desirable responding is required, 
and of how this process may interact with comparative judgments.  
Having discussed the potential advantages of forced-choice formats, the reader might 
wonder why their use is not more widespread. It turns out that the forced-choice formats also 
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have major disadvantages, which are concerned with scaling. We turn to the scaling of 
forced-choice data next. 
Scaling of forced-choice responses 
 The purpose of gathering responses on questionnaire items in psychometric 
applications is to scale the objects of assessment on the psychological attributes measured by 
the questionnaire. Typically, we are interested in absolute scaling so that every object is 
associated with a number on a psychological continuum, and objects can be assessed relative 
to the scale origin. How do we derive absolute scale scores (e.g. personality trait scores,) 
from relative information provided by forced-choice formats (e.g. relative preferences for 
personality test items)? This section describes popular scaling methods for forced-choice 
responses. 
A classical approach, or measurement by ‘fiat’ 
Traditionally, forced-choice data has been treated in a similar way to rating scales. 
Points are awarded for preferring an item; and the points are added to the scale that the item 
is designed to measure. For instance, preferring an item from a pair may result in one point 
being added to that scale which is measured by the item: 
 most  
true of me 
score 
I am relaxed most of the time  0  (to Emotional Stability) 
I start conversations X 1  (to Extraversion) 
 
In blocks of three, four or more items, inverted rank orders (or some linear function of 
these inverted rank orders) would be added to the respective scales that the items are 
designed to measure, so that the item ranked first would earn most points and the item ranked 
last would earn least points: 
11 
 
 most / least  
true of me 
rank order score 
I am relaxed most of the time least 3 0 
I start conversations most 1 2 
I catch on to things quickly  2 1 
 
If an incomplete ranking were obtained, the same logic would apply, with the item 
ranked first earning most points, the item ranked last earning least points, and the items not 
ranked earning an equal number of points in between: 
 most / least 
true of me 
rank order score 
I am relaxed most of the time least 4 0 
I start conversations   1 
I catch on to things quickly   1 
I sympathize with others’ feelings most 1 2 
 
For tasks in which participants are asked to distribute a fixed number of points 
between several items, these points would typically be awarded to the respective scales. 
One common feature of all these scoring protocols is that the number of points 
awarded is quite arbitrary – it is not justified theoretically or empirically. Torgeson (1958) 
called this type of scaling measurement by fiat. Another common feature is that in all the 
above examples the total number of points awarded in the block is constant for all 
respondents. To illustrate, consider our previous example of a forced-choice pair, and another 
forced-choice pair measuring the same personality traits, with the following responses from 
respondent A: 
Respondent A most  
true of me 
score 
I am relaxed most of the time  0  (to Emot. Stability) 




Respondent A most  
true of me 
score 
I rarely get irritated  0  (to Emot. Stability) 
I make friends easily X 1  (to Extraversion) 
 
The responses above will result in 2 points being allotted to Extraversion and 0 points 
to Emotional Stability – 2 points in total. Now consider the following responses to the same 
item-pairs (respondent B): 
Respondent B most  
true of me 
score 
I am relaxed most of the time X 1  (to Emot. Stability) 
I start conversations  0  (to Extraversion) 
 
Respondent B most  
true of me 
score 
I rarely get irritated X 1  (to Emot. Stability) 
I make friends easily  0  (to Extraversion) 
 
These responses will result in 0 points being allotted to Extraversion and 2 points to 
Emotional Stability – again totaling 2 points.  
An immediate implication is that, regardless of the choices made, every participant 
will receive the same total number of points on the test but that the points will be distributed 
differently between different scales. This type of data is called ipsative data. The name was 
coined by Cattell in 1944, from the Latin ‘ipse’ (he, himself), reflecting the fact that any score 
obtained on an ipsative test is relative to self. Indeed, while respondents A and B obtained the 
same number of points, the points were allotted differently to the two scales. All we can 
conclude from these scores is that respondent A’s score on Extraversion is higher than his 
score on Emotional Stability, and that the opposite is true for respondent B. We, however, 
cannot tell where respondents A and B stand in relation to each other on either of these scales 
– it is entirely possible, for example, that respondent B is just as high on Extraversion as 
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respondent A, and he is higher on Emotional Stability still. There is simply no information in 
the assigned points in order to make such inferences.  
 To summarize, in ipsative data the number of points on any scale for an individual 
can only be interpreted in relation to the number of points on other scales, because the total 
number of points on all scales is the same for everyone. The self-referenced nature of ipsative 
scores means that scores are not interpersonally comparable. This is because a score on scale 
A is not scaled in relation to some absolute scale origin, but instead in relation to the 
individual’s own mean. Unlike a normative measure, which allows individuals to have 
different test means, in an ipsative measure the mean is the same for everyone. 
Ipsative data have been criticized for the lack of interpretability of individual 
differences, and other psychometric challenges that follow from this basic property. Clemans 
(1966) provided a full mathematical account of problems with using ipsative data (see also 
Dunlap and Cornwell 1994). Other authors have illustrated how these challenges may 
manifest themselves in applications (e.g. Hicks 1970; Johnson, Wood, and Blinkhorn 1988; 
Tenopyr 1988; Closs 1996; Meade 2004). In the following section, we discuss psychometric 
properties of ipsative data. 
Psychometric properties of ipsative data 
1. Ipsative scores are interpersonally incomparable  
This is the most fundamental property of ipsative scores following directly from their 
definition. Because the same total number of points is allocated to everyone, it is impossible 
to achieve a high score on one scale without reducing scores on other scales. A high score 
received might not be a reflection of a high standing on a theoretical attribute in any 
normative sense (i.e. with reference to a population); instead, it might be simply an artifact of 
having low scores elsewhere on the test. Fundamentally, people with an identical relative 
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ordering of attributes will obtain identical ipsative scores, regardless of their normative 
standing in relation to each other. Clearly, this can have serious implications for assessment 
decisions in applied settings.  
2. Ipsative scores distort construct validity 
Because the total test score on ipsative measures is the same for everyone, it has zero 
variance. Therefore, all elements of the scales’ covariance matrix sum to zero (Clemans 
1966), and the average off-diagonal covariance is a negative value. In an ipsative test 
consisting of k scales with equal variances, the average correlation among the scales must be  
  1 1k    . (1) 
That is, regardless of the expected relationships among the attributes measured by the test, 
their measured scales will correlate negatively on average. Clearly, when the true scores on 
the attributes correlate positively, the ipsative scores will distort these relationships. 
Because elements of the ipsative variance-covariance matrix sum to zero, one of the 
eigenvalues must be zero and maximum likelihood factor analysis cannot be applied (Dunlap 
and Cornwell 1994). Principal components analysis can be performed on ipsative scores; 
however, the resulting components are difficult to interpret as they typically consist of scales 
representing contrasting choices (Cornwell and Dunlap 1994; Baron 1996). Overall, ipsative 
data compromises the construct validity of forced-choice tests. 
3. Ipsative scores distort criterion-related validity 
As the variance of the total test score is zero, covariances of the ipsative scales with 
any external measure will sum to zero (Clemans, 1966; Hicks, 1970). Therefore, any positive 
covariances with the external variable have to be compensated by some spurious negative 
covariances, and vice versa (Johnson, Wood, and Blinkhorn 1988). Such distortions to the 
covariance patterns will be larger when the scales are expected to co-vary with the criterion 
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mostly positively (or negatively). Overall, ipsative data compromises the criterion-related 
validity of forced-choice tests.  
Partially ipsative data 
Having provided a brief summary of the psychometric properties of ipsative data, we 
show how varying item polarity and point assignment can yield data in which the individual 
total score on the test is only partially constrained. Consider our previous example of two 
forced-choice pairs. This time, the second item-pair is designed to indicate Extraversion and 
the negative end of Emotional Stability (i.e. Neuroticism). Here are possible responses from 
respondent A: 
Respondent A most  
true of me 
score 
I am relaxed most of the time  0  (to Emot. Stability) 
I start conversations X 1  (to Extraversion) 
 
Respondent A most  
true of me 
score 
I worry about things* X 1  (to Emot. Stability) 
I feel at ease with people    0  (to Extraversion) 
 
The item ‘I worry about things’ indicates Neuroticism (the opposite end of emotional 
stability) and is negatively keyed (it is scored 1 if preferred in the comparison). The 
responses in this example will result in the allocation of 1 point to Extraversion and 1 point to 
Emotional Stability, 0 points in total.  
Now consider the following responses to the same item-pairs (respondent B): 
Respondent B most  
true of me 
score 
I am relaxed most of the time X 1  (to Emot. Stability) 




Respondent B most  
true of me 
score 
I worry about things*  0  (to Emot. Stability) 
I feel at ease with people  X 1  (to Extraversion) 
 
These responses will result in the allocation of 1 point to Extraversion and 1 point to 
Emotional stability, 2 points in total. The reader can see that respondents A and B obtain 
different numbers of points now. This is because the test contains both positively and 
negatively keyed items indicating the same attribute. Such tests will yield data that shows 
some variation in the total score. This variation is still constrained, because in both item-pairs 
the items indicating Emotional Stability are scored relative to a baseline score obtained on the 
Extraversion items. The type of data derived from such tests is called partially ipsative. It is 
generally less problematic than fully ipsative data; however, its psychometric problems are 
not eliminated but merely reduced.   
An Item Response Theory approach, or measurement by modelling 
The general problem with measurement by fiat is that the scores assigned to items are 
not justified theoretically or empirically. Specifically, the classical approach to scoring of 
forced-choice items treats rankings (relative information) as if they were ratings (absolute 
information). Furthermore, scale scores are computed as the sum of item scores in both the 
forced-choice and the single-stimulus formats. These two formats, nevertheless, reflect very 
different response processes and assign very different meanings to item responses.  
In the single-stimulus format, a respondent selects a rating option that represents the 
level of an attribute or behavior which is closest to that of his or her own. The response, 
therefore, can be directly referenced in relation to a criterion (e.g. the behavior is not 
demonstrated at all, demonstrated to a small extent, or to a large extent), and consequently to 
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a scale origin. We make the same implicit assumption when assigning scores to forced-choice 
items using the classical approach, completely inconsistent with the fact that forced-choice 
responses represent items’ relative positions (in that particular forced-choice block), not the 
absolute levels on the attributes. Consider the situation when a respondent gives the top rank 
to a particular item in a block. This choice does not reflect his/her degree of agreement with 
the item; it simply reflects that he/she agrees with it more than with the other items in the 
block. Thus, similar items indicating the same attribute might be ranked highest in one block 
and lowest in another, depending on the items they are contrasted against, resulting in item 
scores that are inconsistent with the implicit assumption of absolute scaling. Taking this 
reasoning further, we can see that the idea that adding relative positions together somehow 
will constitute a scale score that reflects an absolute attribute score is also illogical. 
Another implicit assumption underlying the classical approach to scoring is that item 
responses are independent from each other, after they have been controlled for the attribute 
levels (local independence assumption). This assumption is clearly violated, because items 
within a block are not assessed independently but in relation to each other. Making forced 
choices creates mutual dependencies between responses to all items in the block. 
To summarize, the classical method of assigning scores to forced-choice items does 
not correspond to the meaning of item responses. In other words, the implicit model 
underlying this scoring bears no relation to the psychological process used in comparative 
judgments (Meade 2004). The consequences of this misrepresentation in the implicit scoring 
model are the problems of ipsative data (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2013). 
Can the situation be improved by adopting an approach that considers the meaning of 
preferential choices? It turns out that it can. By considering the response process to forced-
choice items and devising a model to describe this process, model-based measurement may 
be inferred for forced-choice data. Mellenbergh (2011, p. 188) named this type of scaling 
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‘measurement by modeling’, in contrast to measurement by fiat. This approach is also known 
under the name of Item Response Theory (IRT). 
Several item response models have been developed recently to infer measurement 
from forced-choice data. Four such approaches are briefly described in this chapter: the 
Thurstonian IRT model (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2011a), the Zinnes-Griggs model for 
Unidimensional Pairwise Preferences (Zinnes and Griggs 1974), the Multi-Unidimensional 
Pairwise-Preference (MUPP) model (Stark, Chernyshenko, and Drasgow 2005), and the 
McCloy-Heggestad-Reeve (2005) unfolding model for multidimensional ranking blocks. 
Each of these models has distinct objectives and assumes different forced-choice designs and 
different properties of items used. All models may be used for creating and scoring new 
forced-choice assessments. The Zinnes-Griggs model can also be applied to estimate item 
parameters in forced-choice item-pairs where items measuring the same scale are compared 
(unidimensional items). The Thurstonian IRT model is currently the only one that can be 
readily applied to data collected with existing multidimensional forced-choice questionnaires, 
with the additional objectives of estimating item parameters and relationships between the 
latent attributes. 
In what follows, we briefly describe these models using a common framework. 
Specifically, we distinguish two components of models for forced-choice data: 1) a model for 
the decision process leading to selection of items, and 2) a model for relationships between 
items and the  underlying attributes they measure. Before we consider the logic of the IRT 
models, however, we need to introduce a suitable coding system for forced-choice responses. 
Coding of forced-choice responses  
The system described here is standard in the Thurstonian modeling literature (e.g. 
Maydeu-Olivares and Bockenholt 2005). To begin, let us assume that full rankings are 
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obtained. Full ranking of n items can be equivalently coded as ñ = n(n-1)/2 pairwise 
comparisons. If only two items {i, k} are being ranked, there is only one comparison, the 
outcome of which can be coded as a binary variable: 
 
{ , }
1    if  item  is preferred over item 
y








If three items are being ranked, there are three pairwise comparisons – comparison 
between the first and second items, between the first and third items, and between the second 
and third items. Here is our earlier example ranking, 
item  most / least  
true of me 
rank order 
A I am relaxed most of the time least 3 
B I start conversations most 1 
C I catch on to things quickly  2 
 
and its coding through three binary variables (binary outcomes of three pairwise 
comparisons), 
{A, B}=0     {A, C}=0     {B, C}=1. 
The reader will notice that the above binary coding contains exactly the same 
information as the ranking and that the original rank order can be obtained from the pairwise 
outcomes, and vice versa. The two coding systems are equivalent; however, the binary 
outcomes enable modeling of pairwise preferences using Item Response Theory, as we shall 
see. 
Blocks of any size can be coded as pairwise comparisons. For blocks of four items (A, 
B, C, D), six pairwise comparisons are required: 
{A, B}   {A, C}   {A, D}   {B, C}   {B, D}   {C, D}. 
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For blocks of five, there will be 10 comparisons, etc. When full rankings are obtained, 
every pairwise outcome will be known. When incomplete rankings are obtained, some 
outcomes will be unknown in which case they can be treated as missing data. 
Thurstonian IRT model  
The Thurstonian IRT model was introduced by Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011a) 
to enable analysis of data arising from forced-choice tests measuring multiple traits with 
ranking blocks of any size. The origins of this model reside within the structural equation 
modeling tradition. Specifically, Maydeu-Olivares (1999) proposed a method for analyzing 
the mean and covariance structure of paired comparisons conforming to any observed ranking 
pattern, as was originally suggested by Thurstone (1931) in one of his seminal papers on 
choice behavior. The method relates observed choices to the differences in psychological 
value that respondents place on stimuli. Methods using tetrachoric correlations of 
dichotomous choices are used to estimate these models.  
Maydeu-Olivares and Böckenholt (2005) provided a full account of Thurstonian 
scaling methods as applied to single ranking tasks, including cases where a factorial structure 
may underlie choice behavior (Thurstonian factor models). Moving from a single ranking 
task to multiple tasks (forced-choice blocks making up a test), and reformulating Thurstonian 
factor models as IRT models so that respondents’ scores on underlying dimension(s) could be 
estimated, Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011a) provided the first IRT model suitable for 
analyzing multidimensional forced-choice data. The model may be used for estimating item 
parameters, and estimating correlations between the latent attributes measured by the items. 
Once the model parameters have been estimated, individual attribute scores and their 
standard errors may be established. 
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The Thurstonian IRT model is applicable to forced-choice formats when items are 
ranked within blocks, either fully or partially. Ranking blocks may be of any size, e.g. 
consisting of two items (item-pairs), three items (triplets), four items (quads), etc. Items in 
each block may indicate the same or different attributes, or any mixture of the two. The 
model assumes a monotonic relationship between any questionnaire item and the attribute(s) 
it is designed to measure; i.e. the higher is the attribute score the higher is the item 
endorsement level for positively keyed items; the higher is the attribute score the lower is the 
item endorsement level for negatively keyed items (a dominance response process). 
The remainder of this section gives a brief overview of the theory, implementation 
and applications of Thurstonian IRT models. 
Preference decision model. Since responses to every forced-choice block are 
essentially rankings, suitable models for these data are models for ranking data. One of the 
oldest models for ranking data was proposed by Louis Thurstone (1927; 1931). In this model, 
preference judgments are assumed to arise from a comparison of unobserved utilities of each 
item. Utility is another name for the item’s psychological value (Thurstone 1929), described 
as “the affect that the object calls forth” (p. 160). For illustrative purposes, we can think of 
utility as the extent to which the behavior described in the item corresponds to the 
respondent’s own behavior (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2013). For any given item, 
Thurstone further assumed that its utility is normally distributed across individuals. 
Thurstone argued that any preference judgment relies on comparison of the utility 
values attached by the respondent to the items in question. That is, for any pair of items {i,  
k}, the respondent will rank item i above item k if his/her utility for item i is higher:  
  
    if     utility utility
prefer item 











Taking our first example, “I start conversations” was judged to be ‘very true’ of the 
respondent, and “I am relaxed most of the time” to be ‘somewhat untrue’ of him/her. These 
(single-stimulus) ratings reflected the respondent’s utility judgments. When we asked the 
respondent which one of the two items was most true of him/her, the answer required a 
comparison of the utilities. In our example, the respondent preferred “I start conversations”, 
presumably, because his/her utility for this item was greater.  
Having adopted a convenient coding system that presents any ranking data as several 
pairwise comparisons with binary outcomes (preferred – not preferred), the responses to 
forced-choice blocks can be easily related to the utilities of items. The binary outcomes give 
us the link we need to Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment, so that we can rewrite the 
decision rules (3), this time using differences of utilities    
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We can use these expressions to relate binary outcomes of pairwise comparisons within each 
ranking block to the underlying utilities.  
Measurement model for attributes. The next step in modeling forced-choice 
responses is postulating a model for relations between item utilities and the psychological 
attributes that the items are designed to measure. The Thurstonian IRT model assumes that 
the utilities are related to the attributes via a linear factor analysis model. 
Let us assume that each item measures one attribute
ii
. Then the utilities of items 
depend on the latent attributes as described by a standard linear factor analysis model: 
 utility i = mean i + loading i  attribute a + error i (5) 
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In psychological assessment, the utility of items are not of interest. Instead, the focus 
is on measurement of attributes underlying these utilities. Therefore, the aim is to relate the 
observed pairwise preferences to the latent attributes directly. This is done by presenting the 
difference of two utilities as a function of the latent attributes,  
 utility i  utility k =  
= (mean i  mean k) + (loading i attribute a  loading k attribute b) + (error i  error k). (6) 
Looking again at the decision rule (4), which describes preference for one item or the 
other depending on the item utilities, it becomes clear that we can relate the binary outcome 
to the psychological attributes using (6). If we further simplify this relationship by replacing 
the difference of means with a single threshold value 
 threshold {i, k}=  (mean i  mean k), (7) 
the positive outcome of pairwise comparison y{i, k}= 1 (item i is preferred) occurs when 
threshold{i, k}+ (loading i attribute a  loading k attribute b) + (error i  error k)  0. (8) 
Since the attributes are continuous and the outcomes of pairwise comparisons are 
discrete, the application of Thurstone’s model to forced-choice items results in an IRT model. 
In the standard factor analysis model (5), the errors are assumed to be uncorrelated. 
Therefore, the error part of expression (8) has variance  
 var(error{i, k}) = var(error i  error k) = var(error i ) + var(error k), (9) 
and, finally, the conditional probability of preferring item i to item k as given by the 
cumulative standard normal function is: 
24 
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     
 
. (10) 
This is a formulation of the Thurstonian IRT model for pairwise comparison between items 
measuring two different attributes. 
The probability expression (10) is called the item response function and can be 
interpreted as follows. With an increase in attribute a, and a decrease in attribute b, the 
probability of preferring item i to item k increases (when the items have positive factor 
loadings). This probability is further influenced by item properties: a) factor loadings on the 
attributes that the items are designed to measure; b) a threshold value governing the 
combination of the attributes where the items’ utilities are equal; and c) the error variances of 
the two items. Because two attributes are being measured, the item response function defines 
a surface, an example of which is presented in Figure 1, in which the probability of preferring 
one item to another is plotted against two latent attributes. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
So far, we have assumed that two items measuring different attributes are compared. 
If items measuring the same attribute are being compared, the conditional probability of 
preferring item i to item k is given by the cumulative standard normal function 
  
 { , }
{ , }
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var(error ) var(error )
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. (11) 
One important feature of the one-dimensional model is that a comparison between 
two items measuring the same trait with similar factor loadings will result in a low pairwise 
factor loading, and the pairwise comparison will provide very little information on the latent 
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attribute. Therefore, if one wants to present items measuring the same attribute in a forced-
choice block, items with very different factor loadings should be used, for example an item 
with a positive factor loading could be compared to an item with a negative loading  
(Maydeu-Olivares and Brown 2010). 
The item response function in the one-dimensional case defines a curve, examples of 
which are presented in Figure 2, in which the probability of preferring one item to another is 
plotted against one latent attribute. Figure 2a illustrates the case in which two items with 
factor loadings of opposite sign yield a highly informative comparison; Figure 2b illustrates 
the case where two highly discriminating items yield an uninformative comparison.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Technical detail. To enable parameter estimation, the above IRT model for pairwise 
preferences is embedded in a familiar structural equation modeling (SEM) framework. All 
pairwise comparisons and latent traits in the questionnaire are included, resulting in a single 
measurement model with binary outcomes (an IRT model). The following parameters are 
estimated: factor loadings and error variances for all items, thresholds for all pairwise 
comparisons, and correlations between the latent attributes.  
When block size is n = 2 (item pairs), the model estimates one threshold, two factor 
loadings and one error variance per each pairwise comparison (error variances of individual 
items cannot be identified). In this case, the Thurstonian IRT model is simply the two-
dimensional normal ogive IRT model. 
When block size is n = 3 (triplets), n = 4 (quads) or greater, not all parameters are 
estimated freely for each pairwise comparison. The conditional probability expression (10) 
illustrates the item parameters estimated in this case. As many threshold values as there are 
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pairwise comparisons, are estimated. As many factor loadings as there are items are 
estimated. Finally, as many error variances as there are items are estimated. That is, all 
pairwise comparisons involving the same item will have the same factor loading on the 
attribute measured by that item. For example, pairs {i, k} and {i, q} will have the same factor 
loading on the attribute measured by item i, loadingi. Similarly, error variances of individual 
items, for example var(errori), are estimated. Furthermore, it follows from (6) that errors of 
pairwise comparisons involving the same item will have a shared part, so that local 
dependencies exist among them: 
 cov(error{i, k}, error{i, q}) = var(error i ) . (12) 
These special features when block size is n  3 need to be specified in the 
measurement model; specifically, equality constraints need be placed on factor loadings and 
error variances relating to the same item since these values are estimated per item, not per 
pairwise comparison. In this case, the Thurstonian IRT model is an extension of the normal 
ogive model to items presented in forced-choice blocks. Practical guidance on parameter and 
person score estimation in the case of forced-choice blocks of size 3 is given in the data 
analysis example in this chapter (see Data analysis example with the Forced-Choice Five 
Factor Markers). 
Thurstonian IRT models can be estimated using any method but in typical 
applications, there are too many latent traits for maximum likelihood estimation to be 
feasible. The recommended alternative is to resort to limited information methods based on 
tetrachoric correlations. After the item parameters have been estimated, individual scores on 
latent attributes are estimated by the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) method. The reader is 
referred to Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011a) for further technical detail.  
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These models can be estimated in Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 1998-2012), which 
also performs estimation of attribute scores for individuals. The data analysis example in this 
chapter illustrates the workings of the  Thurstonian modelling approach using Mplus.  
Applications. Applications of the Thurstonian IRT model so far have included re-
analysis of existing forced-choice data and development of new forced-choice questionnaires. 
Re-analysis of existing forced-choice data is particularly interesting since it enables direct 
comparison between classical and model-based IRT scoring. Research using the Customer 
Contact Styles Questionnaire (CCSQ; SHL 1997) demonstrates that even questionnaires with 
challenging features such as large block size and the use of incomplete rankings can be 
analyzed successfully. Furthermore, individual attribute scores estimated by the IRT method 
are free from the problems of ipsative data (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2013). 
Another example is the development of a short version of the Occupational 
Personality Questionnaire (OPQ32r; Brown 2009), in which the questionnaire’s redesign was 
informed by the use of item response modeling, and new IRT-based scoring was applied to 
produce individual attribute scores. This example illustrates how IRT modeling may be 
applied to re-analyze data from an existing assessment tool, and how to use this information 
to re-develop the tool, enhancing its strong features and transforming its scoring protocol. 
For another example, a short forced-choice measure of the Five Factors of personality 
has been developed (Forced-Choice Five Factor Markers; Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 
2011b) using 60 items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg 1992). 
The development of this measure was informed directly by simulation studies using IRT 
modeling. The data analysis example in this chapter uses data collected with this 
questionnaire. 
An interesting application outside of tests that use explicit forced-choice formats is 
reported in a recent study by Lang and colleagues (2012), who addressed the complexities in 
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measuring implicit motives using the Operant Motive Test (OMT; Kuhl and Scheffer 2002). 
The OMT asks respondents to generate stories in response to ambiguous pictures, assessing 
motives of power, affiliation and achievement. Lang and colleagues argued that the notion of 
utility maximization, so central to Thurstone’s account of choice behaviors, applies to 
implicit motives too. Only the strongest implicit motive is expressed in the narrated story, and 
therefore the observed responses must be modeled in relation to choices between different 
implicit (latent) motives. This research suggests a wider applicability of Thurstonian IRT 
modeling to psychological data than the authors of this model first envisaged, and we look 
forward to new developments in this area.  
Zinnes-Griggs model for unidimensional pairwise preferences 
Zinnes and Griggs (1974) introduced an IRT model describing preference judgments 
when choosing one of two items measuring the same attribute. This model originates from 
Coombs’s (1950) ‘unfolding’ scaling tradition for modeling preference data.  
Preference decision model. Coombs (1950) explained people’s preferences for 
stimuli by their relative closeness to the position on the attribute that the stimuli represent. 
According to this model, when facing a choice between two stimuli, the person will prefer the 
stimulus closer to their own position on the attribute (‘ideal point’). The ideal point is the 
person’s location on the attribute of interest – the person’s attribute score, and hence 
 
    if     attribute location attribute location
prefer item 









For example, when choosing between statements measuring Extraversion, a 
respondent will choose a statement that represents a standing on the Extraversion attribute 
that is closest to their own.  Any preferential rank ordering, therefore, can be thought of as an 
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ordering of the stimuli’s locations ‘folded’ at the person’s ideal point (conversely, the stimuli 
locations can be uncovered by ‘unfolding’ the rank orders – hence the name of this decision 
model).  
Zinnes and Griggs (1974) recognized  the limitations of Coombs’s deterministic 
model and modified it by talking about noisy ‘perceptions’ of the locations of both the stimuli 
and the person’s own ideal point at the time of comparison. Thus, Zinnes and Griggs 
considered three normally distributed random variables with expected values corresponding 
to the person’s own ideal point, and the two items’ locations. 
Measurement model for attributes. The preference decision model adopted here 
implicitly assumes an ideal-point response process for every item involved in the 
comparisons. The term ‘ideal point’ was coined by Coombs (1950) based on the original 
work of Thurstone (1928), who described a process of responding to attitude items. 
Thurstone argued that the utility value for a statement such as ‘Fire arms should not belong in 
private hands’ is the highest for individuals with this exact level of attitude towards 
‘militarism’, and reduces for persons with both higher and lower levels of this attitude. 
Coombs called this maximum preference point on the attitude continuum the individual’s 
‘ideal point’, which is characteristic of each person. 
Originally suggested for attitude items, it has recently been proposed that the ideal-
point models can be applied more generally (Drasgow, Chernyshenko, and Stark 2010). Items 
in, say, the personality domain do not have to represent an extremely positive or negative 
standing on the attributes of interest. Items which represent intermediate or average positions 
can also be presented: For instance, ‘My attention to detail is about average’. For such items, 
the linear factor analytic model is unlikely to represent the relationship between the item 
utility and the underlying construct (Conscientiousness) correctly, because the utility of this 
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item is likely to peak around the average Conscientiousness score, and be lower for 
respondents with either high or low scores.  
The latent tendency to endorse an item (utility in Thurstonian terms) in the Zinnes-
Griggs probabilistic model is an inverse of the absolute difference between the person’s 
attribute score and the item location, and their random errors, 
    utility attribute error location errori a i i     . (14) 
Because the absolute difference between the person’s attribute and the item location is 
opposite to the person’s utility for the item, Zinnes and Griggs called it ‘disutility’. They 
showed that the probability of preferring one item to another conditional on the person’s ideal 
point and the items’ locations (all placed on the same attribute continuum) is a one-
dimensional IRT model given by a linear combination of cumulative standard normal 
distribution functions: 
          { , } { , } { , } { , } { , }1 1 2i k i k i k i k i kP y a b a b       , (15) 
where                
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It can be seen that the conditional probability depends only on the person’s score and 
the item locations. The model assumes that the items vary only in their locations on the 
underlying attribute continuum, thus all items are assumed to be equally discriminating. The 
item response function for a pairwise comparison can be plotted against the latent attribute, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. This figure shows that when items with similar locations are 
compared, the comparison yields a very ‘flat’ function with a shallow slope; and when items 
with very dissimilar locations are compared, the comparison yields a function with a steep 
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slope. Therefore, comparisons between items located closely on the same attribute are non-
informative. This is a very similar feature to the one we observed when comparing items with 
similar factor loadings under the Thurstonian IRT model.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Technical detail. Item parameters (locations) can be estimated by the marginal 
maximum likelihood (MML) procedure (Stark and Drasgow 2002). Person parameters 
(attribute scores) can be estimated by either Expected a Posteriori (EAP) or Maximum a 
Posteriori (MAP) methods; EAP is recommended because it is a non-iterative procedure and 
is fast and efficient for one-dimensional models. 
Applications. This straightforward unidimensional model has been applied recently 
in workplace assessments, with an added advantage of employing computerized adaptive 
algorithms. Borman and colleagues (2001) used it to measure job performance via a 
computerized adaptive test, and Schneider and colleagues (2007) used the model to build the 
Navy Computerized Adaptive Personality Scales (NCAPS). 
Multi-Unidimensional Pairwise-Preference (MUPP) model 
The Multi-Unidimensional Pairwise-Preference (MUPP) model was first introduced 
by Stark (2002) to enable scoring of forced-choice tests measuring multiple traits using item-
pairs (i.e. blocks of size 2). The model, further developed by Stark, Chernyshenko and 
Drasgow (2005), adopts yet another approach to explaining preference judgments originally 
suggested by Andrich (1989). Andrich proposed that instead of devising an explicit 
multidimensional model for pairwise comparisons, the probability of preferring one item to 
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another might be approximated by the joint probability of accepting one item and rejecting 
the other. These probabilities of acceptance and rejection are based on characteristics of each 
of the items involved (the items’ IRT parameters) established through single-stimulus item 
trialing.  
The MUPP model may be used to create new forced-choice tests by assembling pairs 
of items based on their single-stimulus IRT parameters, and to estimate individuals’ scores on 
the latent attributes. However, the model does not allow estimating item parameters from the 
actual forced-choice data. Items in each pair may indicate the same or different attributes 
(hence the name multi-unidimensional). The MUPP model assumes an ideal point response 
process for the items involved in comparisons, and therefore it represents Coombs’s 
unfolding tradition. The remainder of this section gives a brief overview of the theory, 
implementation and applications of MUPP models. 
Preference decision model. Andrich (1989) constructed models for pairwise 
preferences from models for single-stimulus responses. His rationale was to consider the 
outcome y{i, k}=1 as a broad endorsement of item i and a non-endorsement of item k, P(1, 0).  
Conversely, the outcome y{i, k}=0 corresponds to a non-endorsement of item i and an 
endorsement of item k, P(0, 1). The other two possible evaluation outcomes, of either 
endorsing two items (1, 1) or not endorsing ether (0, 0) are not admissible in a forced-choice 
task. Then the conditional probability of preferring item i to item k is given by the joint 
probability of accepting one item and rejecting the other, divided by the total probability of 
the two admissible outcomes,  
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Acceptances and rejections of individual items are assumed to be independent events, 
conditional only on the attributes the item measures, therefore 
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The measurement model for attributes. Once the probability of preferring one item 
to another has been established from the probabilities of endorsing and not endorsing the 
individual items, the latter can be easily described using any suitable unidimensional IRT 
models. Stark, Chernyshenko and Drasgow use ideal point models to link individual items 
and the attributes they measure. Specifically, they advocate the use of a binary version of the 
Generalized Graded Unfolding Model or GGUM (Roberts, Donoghue, and Laughlin 2000). 
Unlike the Zinnes-Griggs model, which assumes that all items are equally discriminating, the 
use of GGUM allows a much wider class of items to be used in pairwise comparisons – items 
measuring different attributes, having different discriminating power, different locations and 
even different maximum probability of endorsement. 
The two-dimensional item response function (17) in conjunction with the binary 
GGUM defines a surface, an example of which is presented in Figure 4. The reader can see 
that this is a more complex surface that that given in Figure 1 for the Thurstonian IRT model, 
because the ideal point process of responding to individual items causes a ‘number of peaks 
and valleys’ (Drasgow, Chernyshenko, and Stark 2009; page 74) in the response surface. If 
items measuring the same dimension are used, the MUPP gives a curve similar to those 
depicted in Figure 3. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 




Technical detail. Person parameters (attribute scores) can be estimated by the Bayes 
modal method (Maximum a Posteriori, or MAP). Item parameters used in the unidimensional 
probability expressions (17) may be estimated using the freely available GGUM program 
(http://www.psychology.gatech.edu/unfolding/) from data gathered in single-stimulus item 
trials. The item parameters and the correlations between latent attributes can only be 
estimated from single-stimulus data, not forced-choice data.  
Applications. To date, the MUPP model has been used to create new forced-choice 
questionnaires with items presented in pairs, and to estimate person attribute scores, after 
item parameters have been estimated from single stimulus trials (e.g. Chernyshenko et al. 
2009). Most recently, the MUPP model was used in the development of the Tailored Adaptive 
Personality Assessment System or TAPAS (Drasgow, Chernyshenko, and Stark 2010), a 
comprehensive application taking advantage of computerized adaptive technology to select 
item pairs maximizing multidimensional information for person score estimation. The TAPAS 
is easily customizable to measure any of the 23 personality facets deemed important for 
predicting job performance in civil or military organizations. 
McCloy-Heggestad-Reeve unfolding model for multidimensional ranking blocks 
McCloy, Heggestad and Reeve (2005) sketched a theoretical model for the process of 
responding to multidimensional forced-choice blocks compiled from ideal-point items, and 
used this model to create a system for item selection and scoring that would enable accurate 
estimation of latent attributes. 
The preference decision model. This approach also belongs to the family of 
Coombs’s unfolding models. The model explains preferences for one item over another by 
the relative distances between the item locations and the respondent’s attribute scores. This is 
an extension of Coombs’s original one-dimensional model to the multidimensional case 
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(Coombs 1964; also Bennett and Hayes 1960). According to this model, a person will prefer 
an item to the extent that the person and the item are located nearer each other in 
multidimensional space than is true for another person and item located elsewhere in that 
space. 
Measurement model for attributes. Just as in the Zinnes-Griggs model, equally 
discriminating items with ideal-point response functions are used. However, items measuring 
different attributes may be compared, and forced-choice blocks can be comprised of more 
than 2 items. The use of equally discriminating items with ideal-point response functions is 
necessary for this model to yield forced-choice designs that are effective for accurate 
estimation of attribute scores. Once item parameters have been established, a questionnaire 
can be assembled from blocks of items with locations that vary across the attribute space.  
Data analysis example with the Forced-Choice Five Factor Markers 
This data analysis example is provided to illustrate how the Thurstonian IRT 
modelling approach can be used in practice for item parameter estimation and scoring 
individuals.   Data for this example are available for download together with a questionnaire 
form and Mplus input files necessary to run the analyses from the handbook website. In 
addition to the ready-made Mplus input files for this example, the reader can also download 
an Excel macro, which allows building Mplus syntax for a wide range of forced-choice 
designs using simple steps. The macro comes with a User Guide providing step-by-step 
instructions.   
Measure 
We consider real participant data collected using the Forced-Choice Five Factor 
Markers questionnaire (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2011b). Items for the questionnaire 
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were drawn from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), more specifically from its 
subset of items measuring the Big Five factor markers (Goldberg 1992). The forced-choice 
questionnaire consists of 60 items, which are presented in 20 triplets (blocks of 3), with all 
items within triplets measuring different attributes (so called multidimensional forced 
choice). Participants are asked to select one “most like me” item, and one “least like me” item 
from each block. The first triplet from this questionnaire was presented earlier in this chapter, 
together with example choices: 
 most / least  
true of me 
I am relaxed most of the time least 
I start conversations most 
I catch on to things quickly  
Each trait is measured with 12 items (8 positively keyed and 4 negatively keyed). The 
questionnaire “key” is given in Table 1. 
Sample 
Four-hundred-and-thirty-eight volunteers from the UK completed the questionnaire 
online in return for a feedback report. The sample was balanced in terms of gender (48.4% 
male); age ranged from 16 to 59 years, mean = 33.3, standard deviation = 10.37 years. This is 
the same sample described in Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011a).  
Coding and describing data 
The forced-choice design here is full ranking using 20 blocks of n = 3 items. 
Responses to each block are coded using ñ = n(n-1)/2 = 3 pairwise comparisons, making 20  
3 = 60 pairwise comparisons in total. The outcome of each comparison is coded either 1 or 0 
according to (2), therefore the data are binary.  
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The data file “FCFFMdata.dat” consists of 438 rows of data, one row per participant. 
Each row contains an identification number (ID), and 60 binary outcomes of pairwise 
comparisons. Here is an extract of Mplus syntax declaring our data file and variables: 
DATA:    FILE IS ‘FCFFMdata.dat’; 
VARIABLE:   
 Names ARE ID  
   i1i2 i1i3 i2i3  !first block 
  i4i5 i4i6 i5i6  !second block 
  …  {the rest of pairwise comparisons go here} 
  i58i59 i58i60 i59i60; 
 USEVARIABLES ARE i1i2-i59i60;  !ID is not used in analysis 
 AUXILIARY IS ID; !Writes ID into file with estimated scores 
 CATEGORICAL ARE ALL;  !declaring all used variables categorical 
Setting analysis options 
The Unweighted Least Squares estimator with robust standard errors (denoted 
ULSMV in Mplus) is used to estimate the model
iii
. The parameterisation with unstandardized 
thresholds and factor loadings used in the conditional probability expression (10) is denoted 
‘theta’ in Mplus. Declaring these settings completes the ANALYSIS section.  
   ANALYSIS: 
 ESTIMATOR = ulsmv; 
 PARAMETERIZATION = theta; 
It is important that the correct IRT parameterization (‘theta’) be specified. Once the 
parameters have been estimated, they can be transformed using different parameterizations. 
For example, the results can be standardized with respect to the error variances of pairwise 
comparisons (their error variances are set to 1), to obtain the so-called intercept/slope IRT 
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parameterization. This is done by dividing the threshold and the factor loadings of each 
pairwise comparison {i, k}, by the square root of its error variance,  { }, i kvar error . 
Alternatively, the results can be standardized with respect to the variances of pairwise 
comparisons (their total variances are set to 1). This is done by requesting the standardization 
with respect to observed variables, typing “OUTPUT: STDY;” in Mplus. 
Model setup 
The first part of MODEL command in Mplus describes the hypothesized factor 
structure of our questionnaire. Every latent attribute is defined “BY” its indicators, the 
pairwise comparisons. To provide a metric for the latent attributes, their variances are set to 
unity. For every pairwise comparison declared under an attribute, its factor loading will be 
estimated. We can provide starting values for this estimation depending on the item’s position 
in the comparison and the keyed direction (whether it was designed to be a positive indicator 
of an attribute or a negative indicator). Remember that the first item in comparison retains the 
original sign of its factor loading, while the second has this sign reversed (refer to expression 
(10)). To aid estimation, we can set the starting values to either 1 or -1 depending on the 
item’s position and keying. Syntax will look as follows: 
N  BY    !Neuroticism 
i1i2*-1  (L1) 
i1i3*-1  (L1) 
…  {the rest of pairwise comparisons involving items measuring N} 
; 
E  BY    !Extraversion 
i1i2*-1  (L2_n) 
i2i3*1  (L2) 




O  BY    !Openness 
i1i3*-1  (L3_n) 
i2i3*-1  (L3_n) 
…  {the rest of pairwise comparisons involving items measuring O} 
; 
A  BY    !Agreeableness 
i4i5*1  (L4) 
i4i6*1  (L4) 
…  {the rest of pairwise comparisons involving items measuring A} 
; 
C  BY    !Conscientiousness 
i4i5*-1  (L5_n) 
i5i6*1  (L5) 
…  {the rest of pairwise comparisons involving items measuring C} 
; 
N-C@1;          ! variances for all factors are set to 1 
Symbols in brackets inside the ‘BY’ commands refer to the first special feature of 
forced-choice triplets. This special feature is that any two pairwise comparisons in each block 
involve the same item. For example, comparisons {1, 2} and {1, 3} both involve item 1. As 
explained in Thurstonian IRT model / Technical detail section, the factor loading of item 1, 
“loading1”, has to be the same in both comparisons. The way to tell Mplus to constrain both 
loadings to be the same is to give them the same parameter name (here, L1). When the item 
order in two comparisons is different, for instance, item 2 is last in comparison {1, 2} and 
first in comparison {2, 3}, the factor loadings are the same in magnitude but opposite in sign. 
Hence, we give the parameters different names (L2_n and L2), but constrain them the reverse 
of each other: 
MODEL CONSTRAINT: 
!factor loadings relating to the same item are equal in absolute value 
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 L2_n = -L2; 
 L5_n = -L5; 
… {remaining constraints on factor loadings go here} 
Similar considerations apply to error variance of pairwise comparisons involving the 
same item. First, according to (9), the error variance of any pairwise comparison {i, k} is the 
sum of two components – the error variance of item i and the error variance of item k. 
Second, according to (12),  errors of pairwise comparisons involving the same item are not 
independent; instead, their covariance equals var(errori). A fragment of Mplus syntax 
specifying these relationships for the first block is provided below:  
! declare parameters for error variances of pairwise comparisons  




… {remaining blocks go here} 
! specify covariances between pairwise comparisons involving the same item 
! set parameters for error variances of items, and set their starting values 
i1i2 WITH i1i3*1 (e1); 
i1i2 WITH i2i3*-1 (e2_n); 
i1i3 WITH i2i3*1 (e3); 
… {remaining blocks go here} 
 
MODEL CONSTRAINT: 
! error variance of every pairwise comparison equals the sum of item error variances 
e1e2 = e1 - e2_n; 
e1e3 = e1 + e3; 
e2e3 = -e2_n + e3; 




It can be seen that only three unique parameters are estimated here: e1, e2_n and e3.  
These are the error variances of the three items in the first triplet. The error variances of the 
pairwise comparisons are composites of these three parameters.  
Finally, fixing the error variance of one item per block for identification (here, we 
arbitrarily fix the variance of the last item) completes the MODEL CONSTRAINT section: 
MODEL CONSTRAINT: 
! fix one error variance in each block for identification 
e3=1;   !first block 
e6=1;   !second block 
…  {errors for remaining blocks go here} 
e60=1; 
The above settings and syntax may seem complex and writing them out error prone. 
The good news is that the researcher does not have to do any syntax writing – it is 
automatically written by the Excel macro based on very basic information the researcher 
provides. For full detail, see the User Guide supplied with the macro.  
Estimating attribute scores for individuals 
Attribute scores for individuals in the sample can be estimated after the model 
parameters have been established. This is conveniently implemented in Mplus as an option 
within the estimation process, using the empirical Bayesian (MAP) estimator (Muthén, 1998-
2004). The estimated scores can be saved in a separate file for further use: 
SAVE: FILE IS ‘FCFFMresults.dat’; 
 SAVE=FSCORES; 
When estimating person attribute scores, the estimator makes a simplifying 
assumption that local independence holds. The use of this simplification for scoring 
individuals has little impact on the accuracy of the estimates (Maydeu-Olivares & Brown, 
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2010). Estimation of individual scores is very fast (scores for 438 individuals in this sample 
are estimated and saved in a few seconds).  
Interpreting Mplus output 
Estimation of our model takes little time (around a minute depending on the 
computer). Here we briefly discuss the most important features of Mplus output that are 
specific to Thurstonian IRT models.  
The model estimation part of the output begins with two warnings. The first warning 
is “THE RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (THETA) IS NOT POSITIVE DEFINITE. 
… PROBLEM INVOLVING VARIABLE I2I3.” This is normal and refers to the fact that by 
design, the residual covariance matrix in Thurstonian models is not of full rank (Maydeu-
Olivares and Böckenholt 2005). The second warning is “THE MODEL CONTAINS A NON-
ZERO CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES. SUCH 
CORRELATIONS ARE IGNORED IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE FACTOR 
SCORES.” This warns the researcher that the local dependencies that we have specified for 
pairwise comparisons are ignored when estimating the attribute scores for individuals. 
Next, goodness of fit statistics and indices are printed. The model yields a chi-square 
of 2106.06 on 1660 degrees of freedom; however, the degrees of freedom have to be adjusted 
since there is one redundancy in every block of three items (see Brown and Maydeu-Olivares, 
2012). The fit indices including the degrees of freedom in their computation also need to be 
adjusted. Overall, there are 20 redundancies in the model, so that the correct df = 1640, and 
the correct RMSEA = 0.025.  
The rest of the output provides parameter estimates for our model. First, the factor 
loadings are printed. The reader can compare the below fragment of the output with the input 
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instructions we provided for the factor structure, and confirm that the factor loadings we 
constrained to be equal are indeed equal in pairwise comparisons relating to the same item 
(may have opposite sign depending on the item’s order in the pairwise comparison): 
MODEL RESULTS 
                                                                 Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 N        BY 
    I1I2              -0.705      0.173     -4.086      0.000 
    I1I3              -0.705      0.173     -4.086      0.000 
<…> 
E        BY 
    I1I2              -1.108      0.192     -5.762      0.000 
    I2I3               1.108      0.192      5.762      0.000 
<…> 
 O        BY 
    I1I3              -1.024      0.202     -5.060      0.000 
    I2I3              -1.024      0.202     -5.060      0.000 
<…> 
 A        BY 
    I4I5               0.844      0.139      6.070      0.000 
    I4I6               0.844      0.139      6.070      0.000 
<…> 
 C        BY 
    I4I5              -0.994      0.139     -7.124      0.000 
    I5I6               0.994      0.139      7.124      0.000 
<…> 
Some of the factor loadings are above 1. This is because these are unstandardized 
parameters, as defined by (10).  
Next, the factor covariances are printed. Since we set the factor variances to 1, these 
are correlations between the latent attributes: 
        Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
E        WITH 
    N                 -0.404      0.060     -6.693      0.000 
 O        WITH 
    N                 -0.482      0.068     -7.068      0.000 
    E                  0.479      0.061      7.867      0.000 
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 A        WITH 
    N                 -0.403      0.075     -5.372      0.000 
    E                  0.413      0.068      6.100      0.000 
    O                  0.145      0.086      1.681      0.093 
 C        WITH 
    N                 -0.299      0.073     -4.088      0.000 
    E                  0.232      0.072      3.205      0.001 
    O                  0.349      0.070      5.019      0.000 
    A                  0.307      0.076      4.044      0.000 
Next, the estimated covariances between the errors of the pairwise comparisons are 
printed. The reader is reminded that these covariances equal to the error variance of the 
common item involved in both comparisons, as we specified, and hence the covariance 
between the error of comparison {1,  2} (referred to as I1I2 in Mplus) and {1, 3} (referred to 
as I1I3) is simply the error variance of item 1, var(error1). A fragment below relates to the 
first block: 
                 Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
I1I2     WITH 
    I1I3               1.463      0.517      2.831      0.005 
    I2I3              -0.242      0.221     -1.098      0.272 
 
 I1I3     WITH 
    I2I3               1.000      0.000   Infinity      0.000 
Because we fixed the error for the last item, item 3, to unity, no standard error was 
estimated for this parameter. The covariance between errors of {1, 2} and {2, 3} is negative 
since item 2 is first in comparison {2, 3} and last in comparison {1, 2}; however, the error 
variance of item 2 is of course positive, 0.242. The reader can compare the above output with 
the error variances of the pairwise comparisons printed further in the output:  
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                Two-Tailed 
                        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Residual Variances 
    I1I2               1.705      0.619      2.754      0.006 
    I1I3               2.463      0.517      4.766      0.000 
    I2I3               1.242      0.221      5.628      0.000 
It can be seen that the error variances of the pairwise comparisons are the sums of 
error variances of the two items involved in comparison, for instance 1.705 = 1.463 + 0.242. 
This is exactly how we specified the relationships between errors. Thus, it is clear that the 
only unique estimable parameters are the item errors – the errors of pairwise comparisons are 
simply their combinations. 
Finally, the thresholds for each pairwise comparison are printed. The symbol $1 refers 
to the first and the only threshold, since the data are binary. Here are the thresholds for the 
first block. 
           Two-Tailed 
                       Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
Thresholds 
    I1I2$1             0.231      0.108      2.136      0.033 
    I1I3$1             1.287      0.192      6.706      0.000 
    I2I3$1             1.161      0.161      7.227      0.000 
The estimated thresholds, factor loadings and error variances for these data are given 
in Table 1. The estimated correlations between the five attributes are given in Table 2. They 
are provided so that the reader can practice finding the required parameters in Mplus outputs. 
For further practical guidance on model setup and identification for different forced-choice 
designs, including treatment of missing data in incomplete rankings, and example Mplus 
syntax, see Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2012). 
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Recommendations for creating effective forced-choice assessments 
Recent methodological and technological advances have made item response 
modeling of forced-choice data possible, and new approaches to creating and scoring forced-
choice tests have emerged. However, given that response processes involve comparisons 
between two or more items, and generally lead to multidimensional IRT models, test 
development using forced-choice formats is a more complex endeavor than when single-
stimulus formats are used.  
A number of factors affect forced-choice test design decisions. We have already 
discussed how the nature of preferential choice dictates rules for selecting items in one-
dimensional comparisons. To yield informative comparisons, items with very different factor 
loadings must be used under factor analysis models, and items with very different locations 
should be used under ideal-point models. These are not limitations of particular response 
models – these are the limitations to comparative judgments in recovering absolute 
information. For instance, a small proportion (5-10%) of unidimensional item-pairs have 
been recommended for use alongside multidimensional item pairs to identify the latent trait 
metric under the MUPP model (Drasgow, Chernyshenko, and Stark 2009). Under Thurstonian 
IRT modeling, the latent attribute metric is generally identified without any unidimensional 
comparisons (Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2012), and therefore this model enables the use of 
purely multidimensional forced-choice formats. 
 Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011a) provide guidelines for constructing ordinal 
forced-choice questionnaires with common dominance items that are effective in measuring 
multiple attributes. They show that in questionnaires containing multidimensional 
comparisons only, the attribute scores can be estimated accurately if sufficient numbers of 
good quality items are used, and the following rules are met: 
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Keyed direction of items. When forced-choice tests involve comparisons between 
items keyed in the same direction, as well as items keyed in the opposite direction, accurate 
estimation of attribute scores can be achieved with any number of traits, and any level of trait 
correlations. However, when all comparisons are between items keyed in the same direction, 
the quality of measurement depends on the number of attributes assessed in the test. 
Number of attributes. It is possible to estimate attribute scores accurately using only 
positively keyed items, when the number of traits assessed is large (20-30 or more) and the 
attributes are largely independent on average.  
Correlations between traits. Given the same number of attributes, the lower the 
average correlation between them the more accurate the score estimation will be. 
Block size. Given the same number of items available, combining them in larger 
blocks increases the level of information each item provides for latent attribute estimation. 
This is because the number of pairwise comparisons increases rapidly as the number of items 
in a block increases. However, increasing block size increases cognitive complexity and 
contributes to respondents’ fatigue and random responding.  
The reader interested in using a forced-choice format must remember that the format 
itself cannot correct for faults in item writing, and in some ways makes these faults more 
apparent. In our experience, using negations in forced choice formats is more problematic 
than in single-stimulus formats. Item length can also be a problem, particularly when four or 
more items are compared in one block. Adhering to good item writing practice (Brown and 
Maydeu-Olivares 2010) and the above general rules when designing a forced-choice 
questionnaire will increase its measurement quality. 
To the authors’ knowledge, all item response modeling of forced-choice 
questionnaires to date has been conducted with pairwise comparisons and ranking blocks. 
48 
 
Pairwise comparisons using graded preferences, and compositional forced-choice formats are 
yet to be explored, therefore more research on forced-choice questionnaire design is needed. 
Directions for future research and concluding remarks 
Thanks to the recent developments in IRT-based analysis and scoring, forced-choice 
tests are enjoying a lot of attention from psychometricians, test developers and test users 
alike. They are gaining popularity in workplace assessments, where concerns about response 
distortions are strong. We, however, would like to draw the reader’s attention to applications 
that have been overlooked in the forced-choice literature, and where we believe the gains 
might be very important to the advancement of science. 
In cross-cultural research, where culture-specific response sets present a challenge 
for comparability of scores (Van Herk et al. 2004; Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, and Shavitt 2005), 
the use of forced-choice formats are bound to be advantageous. A recent example of cross-
cultural personality research using forced-choice tests is represented by a study of Bartram’s 
(2013), which examined personality profiles across 31 cultures in relation to country-level 
cultural dimensions. Furthermore, measurement invariance of forced-choice tests can be 
formally tested; for example, constraining the thresholds, the factor loadings and the 
correlations between the latent attributes to be equal across two or more groups in the 
corresponding multi-group Thurstonian IRT model. 
The use of forced-choice formats is likely to prove beneficial in assessments of other 
individuals (as in 360-degree feedback), organizations or services (as in satisfaction 
surveys). In these contexts, rater biases such as leniency/severity and the halo effects are 
notorious (e.g. Brown et al. 2012) and forced-choice formats are ideally placed to counter 
such biases and deliver more usable data.  
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  Historically, the psychometric assessment industry and test users have been more 
enthusiastic about the use of forced-choice assessments than academics have been. While the 
former groups have been excited by the advantages in overcoming common response biases 
and enhanced differentiation between stimuli, the latter group has been concerned about the 
psychometric properties of ipsative data, particularly its interpersonal incomparability. As we 
have shown in this article, academic concerns about the use of ipsative data are well founded. 
Therefore, we advocate the use of item response modeling with forced-choice data, which, in 
conjunction with good test development practices has the potential to overcome these 
problems, and consequently, forced-choice formats have the potential to compete with single-
stimulus formats in applications.  
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Estimated item parameters for the Forced-Choice Five Factor Markers example 
Blocks Items  Pairwise comparisons 
# # Attribute loading var(error)  # threshold 
1 1 N -0.705 1.463  {1,2} 0.231 
 2 E 1.108 0.242  {1,3} 1.287 
 3 O 1.024 1  {2,3} 1.161 
2 4 A 0.845 1.004  {4,5} -0.327 
 5 C 0.994 0.287  {4,6} -1.237 
 6 N -0.804 1  {5,6} -0.834 
3 7 O -0.476 0.052  {7,8} 0.203 
 8 E 0.624 2.904  {7,9} 1.999 
 9 A 0.822 1  {8,9} 2.102 
4 10 C 0.734 1.083  {10,11} 0.415 
 11 O 0.974 0.466  {10,12} -2.155 
 12 N 0.722 1  {11,12} -2.507 
5 13 A 0.552 1.249  {13,14} -2.144 
 14 N 1.194 3.157  {13,15} -0.151 
 15 E 1.243 1  {14,15} 1.813 
6 16 O 0.903 0.92  {16,17} -1.803 
 17 E -0.719 1.091  {16,18} -2.514 
 18 C -0.720 1  {17,18} -0.71 
7 19 E -1.251 2.711  {19,20} -1.575 
 20 N 1.864 4.828  {19,21} 2.378 
 21 A 0.607 1  {20,21} 4.524 
8 22 C 0.667 0.56  {22,23} 0.034 
 23 O 0.665 0.287  {22,24} -1.462 
 24 E -0.698 1  {23,24} -1.505 
9 25 O 1.235 4.803  {25,26} -2.922 
 26 N 1.379 2.276  {25,27} -3.404 
 27 A -1.116 1  {26,27} -0.499 
10 28 C -0.821 0.629  {28,29} 0.358 
 29 N 0.636 0.675  {28,30} 1.636 
 30 E 1.141 1  {29,30} 1.408 
11 31 E 0.847 0.458  {31,32} 0.29 
 32 A 0.676 0.42  {31,33} 0.165 
 33 C 0.838 1  {32,33} -0.249 
12 34 N -0.455 1.219  {34,35} 0.629 
 35 A 0.570 0.79  {34,36} -1.132 
 36 O -0.787 1  {35,36} -1.887 
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13 37 E -0.830 0.731  {37,38} -0.673 
 38 N 1.004 0.756  {37,39} -0.598 
 39 C -0.985 1  {38,39} -0.03 
14 40 A 0.798 1.356  {40,41} 0.112 
 41 C 1.114 1.134  {40,42} 0.301 
 42 O 1.158 1  {41,42} 0.486 
15 43 E 0.838 0.937  {43,44} -0.178 
 44 O 0.983 0.855  {43,45} -2.307 
 45 N 1.109 1  {44,45} -2.424 
16 46 C 1.202 2.074  {46,47} -1.192 
 47 N -1.115 3.062  {46,48} -3.287 
 48 A -0.417 1  {47,48} -2.363 
17 49 C -0.830 2.558  {49,50} 2.644 
 50 A 0.782 1.696  {49,51} 3.038 
 51 O 0.878 1  {50,51} 0.775 
18 52 A -0.899 3.309  {52,53} 2.844 
 53 E 0.956 3.941  {52,54} -0.227 
 54 O -0.702 1  {53,54} -2.758 
19 55 O -0.463 1.823  {55,56} 1.929 
 56 C 0.801 1.036  {55,57} -0.683 
 57 N 0.701 1  {56,57} -2.444 
20 58 C 0.546 1.167  {58,59} -1.992 
 59 A -0.339 0.315  {58,60} -0.031 
 60 E 1.052 1  {59,60} 2.027 
Note: N = 438. N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = 




Estimated latent attribute correlations for the Forced-Choice Five Factor Markers  
 N E O A C 
Neuroticism (N) 1     
Extraversion (E) -.404
**




















Note: N = 438. 
* 
Correlation is significant at p < .01; 
** 





Figure 1.  Example Thurstonian item response function for preferring an item measuring 





Figure 2.  Example Thurstonian item response functions for preferring item i to item k; both 
items measure the same attribute a. 
(a) Items with very different factor loadings 
 
(b) items with very similar factor loadings  
 
 
Note. The dotted and dashed lines illustrate the conditional probabilities of endorsing 
item i and k, respectively. The solid line illustrates the conditional probability of preferring 




Figure 3.  Example Zinnes-Griggs item response functions for preferring item i to item k; 
both items measure the same attribute a. 
 
Note. The dotted line illustrates comparison between items with locations 0.2 and 




Figure 4.  Example MUPP item response function for a pair of items measuring order and 
sociability. 
 
Source: Drasgow, F., Chernyshenko, O. S., & Stark, S. (2009). Test theory and 
personality measurement. In J.N. Butcher (Ed.). Oxford Handbook of Personality Assessment 
(pp. 59-80). London: Oxford University Press. 
 
                                                 
i
 Type I (Preferential Choice) and Type III (Stimulus Comparison) can use exactly the same response 
formats, but differ in whether the data capture information on the respondents themselves (and whether this 
information is of interest). In Type I comparisons, the participant indicates own relationship with the stimuli 
(preference, applicability to self, etc.), and therefore can be placed on the same psychological continuum as the 
stimuli. On contrary, Type III data captures comparisons between stimuli regarding a certain property 
(brightness, sweetness, competence, fairness, etc.). In such comparisons, the respondents act merely as judges, 
they do not indicate own relation to the psychological continuum of interest and therefore cannot be placed on 
this continuum (Coombs, 1964). The Type III data is very common in marketing; it is also popular in 
psychometric applications where judgements about other individuals are collected. 
ii
 This is certainly the aim in most forced-choice questionnaires. The Thurstonian IRT model can easily 
accommodate items measuring multiple attributes (see Brown and Maydeu-Olivares 2012), but for simplicity of 
illustration here we limit the number of measured attributes to one. 
iii
 Alternatively, the Diagonally Weighted Least Squares estimator with robust standard errors may be 
used (denoted WLSMV in Mplus). 
